A Pink Revolution in Indian Policymaking

The 2025 Union budget earmarks 8.86%* of total expenditure for gender-related programs (see MWCD). This central allocation is matched by an extraordinary expansion at the state level. For instance, over the last five years, more than 14 states have introduced women-centric cash transfer programs, reaching over 110 million women—nearly a fifth of India’s adult female population (GDI Partners; see also PRS Legislative Research (pdf)). In many states, the unconditional transfer programs alone account for 6–8% of revenue receipts (The net budget is revenue receipts plus loans and asset sales)—comparable to spending on education or health (see PRS budgetary profiles for Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, West Bengal, etc.). In 2025–26, for instance, Madhya Pradesh allocated 6.4% of its revenue to its Ladli Behna scheme, Maharashtra ~6% to Majhi Ladki Bahin, and Karnataka ~8% to Gruha Lakshmi. For context, approximately 40% of a state’s budget is typically allocated to salaries, pensions, and interest payments.

Alongside this rise in UCTs, states continue to fund Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) for girls, typically structured around girls reaching schooling milestones along with a bond at birth. Though far smaller in annual outlay—roughly one-tenth that of adult UCTs—their cumulative reach is vast. By 2023, West Bengal’s Kanyashree scheme had reached over 5.5 million girls (more here), while Madhya Pradesh’s Ladli Laxmi had enrolled 5.1 million girls to date (ndtv.com).

Other states have expanded targeted subsidies for public goods, particularly around mobility. Since 2021, states like Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka have made bus travel on state buses free for women (womenmobilize.org). The budget outlay is similar to that of CCTs.

These state subsidies are matched by central government subsidies. Launched in 2016, the centrally funded Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY) aims to reduce women’s exposure to harmful indoor air pollution—a major health hazard linked to the use of firewood, dung, and crop waste for cooking. The scheme provides free LPG connections to poor households in the name of an adult woman. By 2019, it had delivered 80 million connections, with a target of 100 million under Ujjwala 2.0 by 2025.

Alongside Ujjwala’s focus on clean energy access, the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY) provides a cash benefit (often supplemented by states) to pregnant women for their first live birth, to improve nutrition and offset wage loss. The scale is significant – as of mid-2025, about 40.3 million women had received payments under PMMVY (myscheme.gov). Some states go further. Odisha’s Mamata scheme, now integrated with PMMVY, provides up to ₹12,000 for a girl child, more than doubling the baseline transfer.

But the shift toward women is not limited to launching new schemes. Some has come through the redesign of existing programs to channel benefits more explicitly to women. One telling reform in this vein is the ownership rules of centrally funded programs. The Ministry of Rural Development mandates that houses built under PMAY-G, the rural housing scheme, must be registered in the name of a woman household member—either solely or jointly. As of the latest data, 69% of homes built under the scheme followed this rule (64 lakh solely, 1.02 crore jointly) (MRD). (In 2024, the government issued a circular mandating strict implementation of the women's ownership rule (TOI).) The mandate regarding women's ownership also means that 100% of PMAY-G’s budget is counted under the Union’s gender allocation.

The policy shift extends to political representation. Since the 1990s, one-third of seats in local government bodies have been reserved for women. Over time, many states expanded this to 50%. In 2023, the 106th Constitutional Amendment extended this principle to state legislatures and Parliament, mandating that one-third of the seats be reserved for women once fresh delimitation is completed.

But Why?

So why this turn toward women? The policy shift defies simple technocratic logic. The targeting of women is often not accompanied by strong outcome-based rationales. For instance, Haushofer and Shapiro 2016 "find little evidence that providing cash transfers to women versus men differentially affects outcomes, broadly in line with the findings of Benhassine et al. (2013)."

If the goal were merely to buy votes, giving money to male heads of households—who may influence multiple voters—is plausibly more efficient. Nor is this shift easily explained by ideology. The architects of these programs are not uniformly liberal; in fact, some of the largest women-targeted schemes are administered by BJP-led states like Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Yet states across the political spectrum have moved decisively toward giving to women. Why?

One part of the answer lies in the framing advantage. Even if many women do not vote independently, targeting them allows politicians to present transfers not as transactional doles, but as moral acts—gestures of care and recognition for mothers, sisters, and daughters. This symbolic framing makes such programs easier to defend, harder to oppose, and more widely resonant than equivalent transfers to men, who are often already embedded in dense networks of subsidies and entitlements.

But beyond symbolism, the politics of giving to women may simply work better. Male recipients are likelier to be part of well-organized groups—farmers, job-seekers, caste blocs—that can escalate demands, reject small gains, or politicize disappointment. Women, by contrast, have historically been under-targeted, and cash transfers to them are more likely to be seen as new entitlements rather than insufficient ones. They are less likely to protest and more likely to associate new benefits with the party in power.

Musings

The longer-term consequences of this shift remain uncertain. Targeting women may strengthen their bargaining position within households and buy political loyalty. But in a context of rising male unemployment and economic insecurity, it also risks producing resentment. The speed and scale of the shift give it the feel of transformation, but when economic power begins to shift faster than social expectations about who should hold it, it can leave fault lines beneath the surface. Whether this triggers a realignment or retrenchment is unclear—but the assumption that such a sharp reorientation of welfare can proceed without friction may prove optimistic.

Postscript

1. Education:
   1. "In 1951, fewer than three in ten girls were enrolled at the primary level of education against six in ten for boys. At the upper primary level, girls were virtually absent - less than 5% were enrolled. This gap has now been closed; an equal or slightly higher proportion of female students as compared to male students are now enrolled at every stage. At the secondary level too, female enrolment has caught up with male enrolment, ..." (Data For India)
   2. More women are enrolled in postgraduate courses in India than men. And the undergraduate enrolment is roughly par. (Data For India)
2. Missing Women. "In China [sex ratio] fell from a peak of 117.8 boys per 100 girls in 2006 to 109.8 last year, and in India from 109.6 in 2010 to 106.8." (The Economist)
3. Turnout. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, women’s turnout reached 65.8%, marginally higher than men’s 65.6% (India Spend).

*Note: The 8.86% figure includes both direct schemes and programs partly counted for women through benefit assumptions. For instance, 40% of the central food subsidy is attributed to women.